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NOTE
HOW DO YOU SOLVE A PROBLEM LIKE
LAW-DISRUPTIVE TECHNOLOGY?
WILLIAM SOWERS∗
I.
INTRODUCTION
Sometimes technology can threaten to upend an entire system of regulation.
Autonomous vehicles challenge current driver-based regulations;1 3D printing
defies patent law;2 the gig economy intensifies an ongoing fight in employment
law.3 This sort of technology—what this Note terms law-disruptive technology4—
has three main characteristics. Law-disruptive technology is new or improved
technology that brings significant societal or economic impacts and does not fit
into existing legal structures.5 In these cases, the current statutory schemes do not
provide answers on how the technology can or should be regulated.
One vivid example of law-disruptive technology is the gig economy worker
classification problem.6 Workers are traditionally defined either as employees or
Copyright © 2019 by William Sowers.
This article is also available online at http://lcp.law.duke.edu/.
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1. Self-Driving Vehicles Enacted Legislation, NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES
(Oct. 3, 2018), http://www.ncsl.org/research/transportation/autonomous-vehicles-self-driving-vehiclesenacted-legislation.aspx [https://perma.cc/X53Y-VVK7]
2. See, e.g., Timothy R. Holbrook & Lucas S. Osborn, Digital Patent Infringement in an Era of 3D
Printing, 48 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1319 (2015) (discussing the protections of current intellectual property
laws on CAD files).
3. Michael L. Nadler, Independent Employees: A New Category of Workers for the Gig Economy,
19 N.C. J. L. & TECH. 443, 458–59 (2018).
4. In researching for a paper on the gig economy, I realized that there was not an established
classification for this sort of technology. Disruptive technology, while used broadly in media and popular
writing, has a very specific meaning. See Clayton M. Christensen, Michael E. Raynor & Rory McDonald,
What is Disruptive Innovation?, HARV. BUS. REV., Dec. 2015, https://hbr.org/2015/12/what-is-disruptiveinnovation [https://perma.cc/RU8X-M534] (describing the expansion of the term disruptive innovation).
Under the technical definition, disruptive technology involves a smaller company with few resources
successfully challenging an incumbent by using “low-end or new-market footholds,” then moving upmarket and taking the incumbent company’s business while preserving their advantages. Id. This narrow
definition does not encompass the sorts of companies and technologies many believe to be disruptive—
including Uber. Id. Thus, this Note proposes a new classification, “law-disruptive technology.” This
classification disregards the process by which the technology disrupts, and instead focuses on the impacts
of the disruption.
5. Infra, Part III.
6. The “gig economy” refers to the growing phenomenon of companies (or individuals) hiring a
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as independent contractors, and courts use a variety of tests to sort workers into
one of the two categories.7 Both classifications pose advantages and
disadvantages for employees and employers. Employees are eligible for a variety
of benefits and protections unavailable to independent contractors.8 But it is
much more expensive for a company to hire an employee than an independent
contractor.9 Alternatively, independent contractors are, as their name suggests,
independent. Independent contractors decide who to work for—customarily
more than one employer at a time—and can control their schedules and hours
worked.10 Thus, companies have less control over independent contractors.
While there has long been tension between the classification of employees
and independent contractors,11 the rise of the gig economy brought renewed
attention to these categories and led experts to question whether two categories
are sufficient.12 Much has been written, both academically and in popular media,
about how to classify workers in the gig economy:13 as employees, independent
contractors, or some third yet-to-be-created category.14
So how do we solve a law-disruptive technology problem like gig economy
worker classification? We must first determine who should solve the problem.
This Note advances the theory that, while courts may be the most obvious forum
for resolving this dispute, they will not provide the best solution. An analysis of
the comparative institutional competence of the three branches of federal
government reveals that the legislative branch and the executive branch, through
executive agencies, are better equipped than the judicial branch to address how

worker to do one discrete task—a gig—on demand, rather than hiring a worker to do the task over and
over. Elka Torpey & Andrew Hogan, Working in a Gig Economy, U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS:
CAREER OUTLOOK 1 (May, 2016), https://www.bls.gov/careeroutlook/2016/article/pdf/what-is-the-gigeconomy.pdf [https://perma.cc/A9R7-NQL8] These workers are often classified as independent
contractors rather than employees. Id.
7. Muhl, What is an Employee? The Answer Depends on Federal Law, 125 MONTHLY LAB. REV. 3,
5 (2002).
8. Nadler, supra note 3, at 459.
9. Id.; see also Alana Semuels, What Happens When Gig-Economy Workers Become Employees,
THE ATLANTIC, Sept. 14, 2018, https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2018/09/gig-economyindependent-contractors/570307/ [https://perma.cc/Q4U6-UK6N]
10. SETH D. HARRIS & ALAN B. KRUEGER, THE HAMILTON PROJECT, A PROPOSAL FOR
MODERNIZING LABOR LAWS FOR TWENTY-FIRST-CENTURY WORK: THE “INDEPENDENT WORKER”
2 (Dec. 2015), http://www.hamiltonproject.org/assets/files/modernizing_labor_laws_for_twenty_first_
century_work_krueger_harris.pdf [https://perma.cc/P8CZ-6JM8]
11. Alan Hyde, Employment Law After the Death of Employment, 1 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 99,
101 (1998) (arguing that the employee/independent contractor dichotomy is unclear and that many
workers do not fit into these two categories).
12. E.g., Miriam A. Cherry, Beyond Misclassification: The Digital Transformation of Work, 37
COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 577, 578 (2016).
13. See, e.g., Miriam A. Cherry & Antonio Aloisi, “Dependent Contractors” in the Gig Economy: A
Comparative Approach, 66 AM. U. L. REV. 635 (2017); Omri Ben-Shahar, Are Uber Drivers Employees?
Nov.
15,
2017,
The
Answer
Will
Shape
the
Sharing
Economy,
FORBES,
https://www.forbes.com/sites/omribenshahar/2017/11/15/are-uber-drivers-employees-the-answer-willshape-the-sharing-economy/#123f98535e55 [https://perma.cc/38WQ-YERG]
14. Cherry, supra note 13.
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existing statutes interact with law-disruptive technology.15 One of the main
reasons that legislatures and agencies are better suited to manage law-disruptive
technology is that they can find new solutions, while courts must shoehorn lawdisruptive technology into existing categories.
Shoehorning is different from analogical reasoning, which courts use every
day.16 Using analogical reasoning, with each new fact pattern a court must
determine whether to extend a test—or rule, or elements—to the facts at hand.
H.L.A. Hart laid out a classic example of this sort of reasoning when he
questioned whether bicycles are allowed in a park where “vehicles” are
prohibited.17
Shoehorning, in contrast, evokes the more negative implications of analogical
reasoning.18 It conjures the image of being crammed—smashed into a container
not appropriately sized.19 In shoehorning, new problems are forced into existing
doctrines where they simply do not fit. Law-disruptive technology, for instance,
involves not just new applications of the law, but applications of the law to
technology that did not exist at the time the legislation was enacted.20 In this sort
of situation, the shoehorn is the wrong tool. Questions about how to fit lawdisruptive technology into the legal framework should be assigned to the political
branches, which can change the existing categories or create new ones altogether.
Part II of this Note defines law-disruptive technology and explores three
examples: the gig economy worker classifications, 3D printing, and driverless
cars. Part III of this Note explores the competencies of the judiciary, Congress,
and federal agencies in statutory interpretation. Part IV analyzes the relative
competence of the branches in dealing with law-disruptive technology using the
gig economy worker classification problem as an example. Finally, Part V offers
a brief conclusion and options for practical implementation.
15. While this Note refers to Congressional action as “interpretation” for consistency, interpretation
is a misnomer. When Congress acts, even to fix previous misinterpretations by the coordinate branches,
it is legislating, not interpreting. The executive and judiciary branches go on to interpret this new
legislation. Although this note may slightly misuse “interpret”, it is intentional. This note considers lawdisruptive technology, that is, technology that may or may not fit into an existing statutory scheme. Thus,
there is a question as to whether the new technology should fit into the existing legislation or the
technology should receive its own legislation. In this sense Congress is “interpreting.”
16. See Emily Sherwin, Defense of Analogical Reasoning in Law, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 1179, 1179
(1999) (“According to traditional understanding, judges engage in a special form of reasoning, the
method of analogy.”). The use of analogical reasoning by judges is somewhat controversial. Id. Legal
realists, among others, have criticized analogical reasoning as inherently and irredeemably inconsistent.
Id. at 1183.
17. H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV.
593, 607 (1958) (“A legal rule forbids you to take a vehicle into the public park. Plainly this forbids an
automobile, but what about bicycles, roller skates, toy automobiles? What about airplanes? Are these,
as we say, to be called “vehicles” for the purpose of the rule or not?”).
18. See, e.g., Concrete Pipe & Prods. v. Constr. Laborers Pension Tr., 508 U.S. 602, 643 (1993)
(“While Concrete Pipe tries to shoehorn its claim . . .”).
19. Shoehorn, MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/shoehorn
[https://perma.cc/3KZM-EX2V] (last visited Feb. 13, 2018).
20. For instance, what if a future court had to determine whether teleportation was banned under
the vehicle prohibition?
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Before jumping into the analysis, three final clarifications are in order. First,
this Note focuses on statutory interpretation rather than constitutional
interpretation or the development of common law. Similar questions of how to
apply new technology to existing rules also arise in the constitutional context.21
The rules of constitutional interpretation, however, involve additional
complexities not considered here. Likewise, common law development is
traditionally handled by the courts, and doesn’t present the same questions of
institutional competence. Second, institutional competence literature has almost
no empirical data available.22 Empirical answers to institutional competence
questions, moreover, may be “unresolvable at acceptable cost within any
reasonable time frame.”23 Thus, this Note, like most works discussing institutional
competence, deals heavily in theory. Third, to limit the scope to a sizeable
inquiry, this Note focuses on the competencies of federal institutions.
II.
LAW-DISRUPTIVE TECHNOLOGY
Courts should—based on institutional competency—defer to the political
branches on statutory interpretation questions dealing with law-disruptive
technology. This begs the question: what is law-disruptive technology?
The proposed concept of law-disruptive technology has three distinct
features. First, law-disruptive technology involves a new or improved technology.
Second, it has the potential to make a significant economic or societal impact.
Third, law-disruptive technology does not fit into the current legal framework.
Technology often tests current legal rules.24 Courts should not necessarily
yield to the other branches’ interpretations simply because a case involves some
technology the court has not dealt with before. For instance, a new type of knee
implant likely falls under the same statutory scheme regulating all current joint
implants. Thus, new is not always disruptive. This proposed framework provides
a basic formula for differentiating between new and disruptive. This section
considers each of these features in turn by analyzing three of the most notable,
current examples of law-disruptive technology: the gig economy, 3D printing, and
self-driving cars.

21. See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 402 (2012) (considering whether a GPS tracker on
a car established a search under the Fourth Amendment).
22. ADRIAN VERMEULE, JUDGING UNDER UNCERTAINTY: AN INSTITUTIONAL THEORY OF
LEGAL INTERPRETATION 153 (2006).
23. Id. at 158.
24. For instance, cities and municipalities had to come up with ways to manage the popular
hoverboards. Michael Cabantuan, State’s Hoverboard Access Law Lands Just in Time, S.F. CHRON., Dec.
27, 2015, https://www.sfchronicle.com/bayarea/article/Sate-s-hoverboard-access-law-lands-just-in-time6722893.php [https://perma.cc/5EQ5-3GRB]
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A. New or Improved Technology
Law-disruptive technology is a new technology. But law-disruptive
technology does not have to be entirely new. In technology, “a difference in
degree can become a difference in kind.”25 For example, gig economy companies
are not the first companies to play with the employee v. independent contractor
line.26 But, unlike existing industries, the entire gig economy is made up of
“crowdwork”—it “rel[ies] on technology to deploy workers to perform tasks . . .
for requesters in the real world paying for those services.”27 The foundation of
the gig economy is its ability to match people doing tasks with those in need of
help just-in-time. Requiring gig economy companies to classify workers as
employees might destroy the very competitive advantage of gig economy
companies by reducing their ability to provide just-in-time labor.28 The gig
economy is therefore new in that, unlike previous companies that attempted to
skirt the employee/contractor line, here the entire industry is built on just-in-time
workers.
Moreover, because the gig economy is new, it is unclear how different legal
and policy choices will impact law-disruptive technology. Forcing law-disruptive
technology into a current statutory scheme could possibly shut down the new
technology altogether.29 It might alter or destroy the trait that led people to adopt
the law-disruptive technology in the first place. The gig economy has thrived, at
least in part, because people want flexibility.30 However, classifying gig economy
25. Neal K. Katyal, Disruptive Technologies and the Law, 102 GEO. L.J. 1685, 1687 (2014).
26. E.g., Craig v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., 792 F.3d 818 (7th Cir. 2015) (considering whether
FedEx workers qualify as employees); see also Hyde, supra note 11 (arguing that the
employee/independent contractor dichotomy was unclear long before the gig economy, and that many
workers do not fit into these two categories).
27. Cherry & Aloisi, supra note 13, at 641.
28. Not all gig economy companies classify their workers as independent contractors. And some
companies that classify workers as independent contractors nonetheless offer benefits, such as health
insurance, traditionally only offered to employees. Antonio Aloisi, Commoditized Workers: Case Study
Research on Labor Law Issues Arising from a Set of “On-Demand/Gig Economy” Platforms, 37 COMP.
LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 653, 684–85 (2016) (noting that Taskrabbit offers its independent contractors
discounted health insurance, and Hello Alfred, Luxe, and Shyp decided to classify their workers as
employees).
29. See, e.g., Dara Kerr & Richard Nieva, On-Demand Cleaning Startup Homejoy Shuts Up Shop,
CNET (July 17, 2015) https://www.cnet.com/news/on-demand-cleaning-startup-homejoy-shuts-up-shop/
[https://perma.cc/T63Z-PJ3A] (explaining that gig economy company Homejoy, which specialized in ondemand home cleaning, shut down in part because the company was sued for allegedly illegally
misclassifying its workers as independent contractors rather than employees).
30. ARUN SUNDARARAJAN, THE SHARING ECONOMY: THE END OF EMPLOYMENT AND THE RISE
OF CROWD-BASED CAPITALISM 159 (2016) (“The Uber driver population also seems to not see full-time
employment as the Holy Grail. In a survey conducted in June 2015 by SherpaShare, a provider
of financial services to sharing economy providers, two out of three Uber drivers indicated that they
viewed themselves as independent contractors to the platform rather than as employees.”); V. B. Dubal,
Winning the Battle, Losing the War?: Assessing the Impact of Misclassification Litigation on Workers in
the Gig Economy, 2017 WIS. L. REV. 739, 796–97 (finding that in early gig misclassification cases,
litigation was not ultimately successful because workers did not want full employee classification, they
only wanted particular rights); ERNST & YOUNG, GLOBAL GENERATIONS: A GLOBAL STUDY ON
WORK-LIFE CHALLENGES ACROSS GENERATIONS 12 (2015), https://www.ey.com/Publication/
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workers as employees would likely lead to a decrease in flexibility, because gig
economy companies would have the right to schedule employees’ work hours and
to require a set number of hours worked per week. Thus, an interpretation of
statutes dealing with gig economy worker classification that classifies all workers
as employees could change the entire industry.31
B. Significant Economic or Societal Impact
In addition to being new or improved, law-disruptive technology must have a
significant impact on the economy or society. There is, of course, no specific
measurement of “significant impact.” But we can glean some clues from the
examples of law-disruptive technology.
For instance, the gig economy may employ as much as ten percent of the
workforce, although these numbers are disputed.32 The user numbers, however,
are less disputed.33 As of January 2016, over 90 million U.S. adults had
participated in a gig economy transaction.34 Thus, at least on the user end, the
impact of the gig economy is significant.
Likewise, while the impacts are not yet realized, 3D printing has experienced
“rapid uptake at different layers of society.”35 3D printing has the ability to
impact all three levels of manufacturing: the home, the start-up, and the assembly
line.36 Some experts estimate 3D printing may have as much as a $600 billion
impact on the U.S. economy.37 3D printing is already having a major economic
impact. For example, by 2018, experts predicted that 3D printing could result in
as much as $100 billion in losses as a result of intellectual property theft.38
vwLUAssets/EY-global-generations-a-global-study-on-work-life-challenges-across-generations/$FILE/
EY-global-generations-a-global-study-on-work-life-challenges-across-generations.pdf
[https://perma.cc/CQ2D-HVNF] (noting that two of the five top reasons for leaving full-time
employment are to work fewer hours, and to increase flexibility).
31. Moreover, statutory interpretation in the worker classification realm can have huge collateral
consequences. Worker classification impacts the traditional employment statutes protecting at-work
rights such as the right to unionize, National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–169 (2012); freedom
from workplace discrimination, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2012); and
the right to overtime, The Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 207 (2012). However, employment
classification impacts other areas that are not necessarily considered “employment” rights, such as tax
liability. E.g. Federal Insurance Contribution Act, 26 U.S.C. §§ 3101 3128. Any institution interpreting
the meaning of employee under federal statute must keep these collateral consequences in mind.
32. Ben Casselman, Maybe the Gig Economy Isn’t Reshaping Work After All, N.Y. TIMES, June 7,
2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/07/business/economy/work-gig-economy.html [https://perma.cc/
98Y7-U2P2].
33. Katy Steinmetz, Exclusive: See How Big the Gig Economy Really Is, TIME, Jan. 6, 2016,
http://time.com/4169532/sharing-economy-poll/ [https://perma.cc/RXD6-J99Y].
34. Id.
35. Deven R. Desai & Gerard N. Magliocca, Patents, Meet Napster: 3D Printing and the Digitization
of Things, 102 GEO. L.J. 1691, 1694 (2014).
36. Id. at 1698.
37. Sean Monahan & Tim Simpson, 3-D Printing’s Economic Benefits Are Too Big to Ignore, THE
HILL, Nov. 9, 2017, https://thehill.com/opinion/technology/359672-3-d-printings-economic-benefits-aretoo-big-to-ignore [https://perma.cc/ZE84-DFT9].
38. Gartner Says Uses of 3D Printing Will Ignite Major Debate on Ethics and Regulation,
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Driverless cars, too, have the potential to change society and the economy.
Car crashes currently kill over 30,000 people per year and cost over two percent
of the U.S. GDP.39 Researchers indicate that driverless technology could reduce
crashes to one percent of the current rate.40
As these examples illustrate, law-disruptive technology is limited to major
technological innovations or improvements that can significantly impact the
economy or society. As the societal or economic impact decreases, the line
becomes fuzzier between what is merely a new technology and what is a lawdisruptive technology. But reasoned judgment, along with consideration of the
other element of law-disruptive technology, should allow for sorting.
C. Law-Disruptive Technology Does Not Fit into Existing Legal Structures
The final element of law-disruptive technology is that it does not neatly fit
into existing legal paradigms, particularly existing statutes. The question is not
whether the statute was written in a way that left some ambiguity—for instance,
whether bicycles are vehicles and thus prohibited from the park.41 Rather, the
question is whether the technology that was clearly not considered at the time of
enactment, because it did not yet exist, should be forced into the existing
statutory structure.
For example, the gig economy worker classification problem does not fit
neatly into the employee v. independent contractor dichotomy. As an initial
problem, there is not a clear definition for employees or independent contractors.
Often the test for determining worker classification depends on which federal law
is being applied.42 Moreover, gig economy workers appear to share characteristics
of both employees and independent contractors: courts have had a difficult time
determining whether gig economy workers are employees or independent
contractors.43

GARTNER.COM (Jan. 29, 2014).
39. Katyal, supra note 25, at 1688.
40. Id. This does not even take into account the time and fuel savings that might result from more
efficient driving. Some estimate this could save 2,272 hours of travel time and 724 million gallons of gas
a year. Id. at 1689. For a fascinating look at the possible advantages and barriers to implementation of
driverless cars, see DANIEL J. FAGNANT & KARA M. KOCKELMAN, ENO CTR. FOR TRANSP.,
PREPARING A NATION FOR AUTONOMOUS VEHICLES: OPPORTUNITIES, BARRIERS AND POLICY
RECOMMENDATIONS (2013), available at https://www.enotrans.org/etl-material/preparing-a-nation-forautonomous-vehicles-opportunities-barriers-and-policy-recommendations/
[https://perma.cc/MJ3EGQF9].
41. Supra Part I, at 4.
42. Richard R. Carlson, Why the Law Still Can’t Tell an Employee When It Sees One and How It
Ought to Stop Trying, 22 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 295, 299 (2001). The Fair Labor Standards Act,
for instance, defines an employee as “any individual employed by an employer.” 29 U.S.C. § 203. To
make sense of such circular definitions, courts have developed three different tests to determine whether
a worker counts as an employee. Muhl, supra note 7, at 6. Each test applies to a different set of federal
laws. Id.
43. See, e.g., Lawson v. Grubhub, Inc., 302 F. Supp. 3d 1071 (N.D. Cal. 2018) (finding that five of
nine factors cut in favor of classifying the worker as an independent contractor).
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So too, 3D printing lingers around the edges of the current statutory
framework. For instance, 3D printing threatens one of the barriers to patent
infringement—the barrier of production.44 Patent law is founded, in part, on the
idea that it is difficult to reproduce someone’s product and thus infringe on their
patent.45 3D printing removes this protection by making it easy to reproduce a
product at home. Thus, it is uncertain what protections patent law provides. In
this way, 3D printing mirrors an earlier law-disruptive technology, the
digitization of music, which required new legislation to save an entire industry.46
Self-driving cars may provide the clearest example of technology that evades
classification and regulation under existing statutory schemes.47 States currently
have “no legal framework” for determining liability in a driverless-car accident.48
Moreover, some state statutes currently provide criminal liability for drivers who
violate traffic laws.49 It is unclear if criminal liability could or should attach to the
“driver” of an automated vehicle.
Driver age restrictions provide another example of how driverless cars defy
current statutory regimes. Utah’s age requirement, for instance, reads, “A person
under 16 years of age, whether resident or nonresident of this state, may not
operate a motor vehicle upon any highway of this state.”50 Yet one of the biggest
advantages of autonomous vehicles is that they do not need any driver, much less
one over the age of sixteen.
***
Law-disruptive technology is different from mere innovation. As these three
proposed forms of law-disruptive technology—the gig economy, 3D printing, and
driverless cars—illustrate, law-disruptive technology involves not only new or
improved technology. It must have the potential to make a significant economic
or societal impact. And it does not fit into the current legal framework.

44. Desai & Magliocca, supra note 35, at 1704.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 1703–04.
47. Cars are, at least in terms of driving rules as opposed to safety or environmental manufacturing
rules, mostly regulated at the state level. Thus, they fall outside of this Note’s scope for purposes of
evaluating the institutional competence of the branches of the Federal Government to decide statutory
interpretation questions in cases of law-disruptive technology. These state driver and vehicle safety laws
are still instructive as an example of how law-disruptive technology evades definition or regulation under
existing statutes.
48. Katyal, supra note 25, at 1689.
49. VA. CODE ANN. § 46.2-862 (2018) (“A person shall be guilty of reckless driving who drives a
motor vehicle on the highways in the Commonwealth (i) at a speed of twenty miles per hour or more in
excess of the applicable maximum speed limit or (ii) in excess of eighty miles per hour regardless of the
applicable maximum speed limit.”).
50. UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-8-1 (2018).
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III.
INSTITUTIONAL COMPETENCE
The judiciary is not the only branch of the government tasked with statutory
interpretation.51 The executive branch is charged with interpreting statutes; the
President must determine how to faithfully execute the law.52 Congress, too,
“interprets” statutes—for example by passing new legislation to overturn judicial
precedent that did not align with Congressional intent.53
All interpretation is not created equal. Each branch has intrinsic strengths
and weaknesses—institutional competencies—that impact the effectiveness of
that branch’s interpretations.54 Thus, when considering the mode of statutory
interpretation to use, two scholars noted: “[t]he central question is not how, in
principle, should a text be interpreted? The question instead is how should
certain institutions, with their distinctive abilities and limitations, interpret
certain texts?”55 And the process of institutional choice—deciding who should
decide—is not a mere academic exercise. Choosing who decides may ultimately
impact which rights are recognized.56
Moreover, the process of choosing the most competent institution to
undertake a particular task is comparative.57 The relative strengths and
weaknesses of each institution must be weighed.58 The best option must be chosen
from among “highly imperfect alternatives.”59 Thus, even the institution best
suited for a task might not be good at that task.60
Another difficulty of comparative institutional analysis is that there must be
a benchmark to determine what makes one institution’s process better than the

51. Trevor W. Morrison, Constitutional Avoidance in the Executive Branch, 106 COLUM. L.REV.
1189, 1190 (2006).
52. Id. at 1191; Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 733 (1986) (“Interpreting a law enacted by Congress
to implement the legislative mandate is the very essence of ‘execution’ of the law.”).
53. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 101
YALE L.J. 331, 424 (1991) (outlining Congressional action overturning judicial decisions in appendix I);
e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 101-544, at 12 (1990) (“The Committee has determined that the Supreme Court
misinterpreted Congressional intent.”); S. REP. No. 101-263, at 1510 (1990) (“The Supreme Court
incorrectly held that the ADEA permitted arbitrary age discrimination in employee benefit plans. The
bill is necessary to correct that erroneous holding.”); S. REP. NO. 100-64, at 1 (1987) (“S. 557 was
introduced on February 19, 1987, to overturn the Supreme Court’s 1984 decision in Grove City College
v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555 and to restore the effectiveness and vitality of the four major civil rights statutes that
prohibit discrimination in federally assisted programs.”).
54. Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, Interpretation and Institutions, 101 MICH. L.REV. 885, 886
(2003).
55. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
56. Lawrence M. Solan, Statutory Inflation and Institutional Choice, 44 WM. & MARY L.REV. 2209,
2282–83 (2003).
57. Ernest A Young, Making Federalism Doctrine: Fidelity, Institutional Competence, and
Compensating Adjustments, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1733, 1818 (2005).
58. Id.
59. NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN LAW,
ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 5 (1994).
60. Id. at 6.
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others, rather than just different. “[I]nstitutional choice cannot be assessed
except against the [benchmark] of some social goal or set of goals.”61 Of course,
scholars are split on what the goal should be.62 The law-and-economics wing, for
instance, sees resource allocation efficiency as the ultimate goal.63 In contrast,
Constitutional law is often evaluated in terms of social goals.64 These goals are
usually tied to a particular set of public policies.65 Thus, merely determining the
goals of institutional choice may have an impact on the outcome of the underlying
inquiry.66 Here, determining the goals in regulating law-disruptive technology
may have an almost-dispositive effect.67
So what should the goals be when considering law-disruptive technology?
First, the ideal institution for considering law-disruptive technology should be
democratically accountable. Law-disruptive technology is new. Law-disruptive
technology does not fit into existing statutory schemes. Thus, by definition, a
democratically accountable institution has not yet considered how to regulate the
law-disruptive technology. Moreover, law-disruptive technology has the
potential to impact the economy and society on an enormous scale. Accordingly,
society should have a say in the outcome. The institution best suited for statutory
interpretation in the realm of law-disruptive technology is, therefore, one that is
aware of and responsive to the will of the people.
A second goal for interpretation is to align statutory interpretation with the
purposes of a system of legal rules.68 Thus, the laws governing law-disruptive
technology should, ideally, be predictable and effective.69 But law-disruptive
technology is by its very nature unpredictable.70 The branch of government best
suited for statutory interpretation related to law-disruptive technology should be
able to create comprehensive rules that impose structure. And it should be able
to do so quickly. Law-disruptive technology has the ability to change society.
People, government, and businesses need to understand how to deal with these
new technologies as they arise.

61. Id. at 5.
62. Id. at 4 (discussing possible goal alternatives).
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. For instance, if a goal of law-disruptive technology is to allow the public to have a say in how the
technology should be regulated, the job of interpreting statutes related to law-disruptive technology
likely should not fall to the courts.
68. William N. Eskridge Jr., Expanding Chevron’s Domain: A Comparative Institutional Analysis of
the Relative Competence of Courts and Agencies to Interpret Statutes, 2013 WIS. L.REV. 411, 414.
69. Id.
70. Jennifer Pinsof, A New Take on an Old Problem: Employee Misclassification in the Modern GigEconomy, 22 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L.REV. 341, 353 (2016) (noting that in addition to individual
consequences for employers, governments may also face a sizeable reduction in payroll taxes due to the
increasing number of gig economy employees classified as independent contractors).
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Based on these goals,71 a comparison of the institutional competencies of
federal courts, Congress, and federal agencies reveals that statutory
interpretation questions involving law-disruptive technology are best left to the
legislature or agencies. Courts should defer, where possible, to the more
competent political branches in these situations.
A. The Judiciary
Often the judiciary is tasked with testing how new technology fits into current
legal structures. But, based on an analysis of the institutional structure of the
judiciary, it is not clear that it is the best institution to handle law-disruptive
technology. The federal judiciary is marked by four distinct characteristics. First,
judges are highly educated and generally trained to undertake rigorous statutory
interpretation. Second, the federal judiciary is relatively difficult to access. Third,
courts are constrained in their fact-gathering abilities. Fourth, judges are
independent and not politically accountable.
The judiciary has institutional strengths that lend it to statutory
interpretation. Judges are uniquely situated to perform an exacting textual
analysis of laws and regulations.72 Federal judges are, usually, highly intelligent
and well-educated.73 Moreover, they are trained to exercise detached judgment.74
And most federal judges are generalists.75 The general nature of federal judges’
dockets allows for “cross-fertilization.”76 Courts can apply lessons learned from
one statute to new statutes. Thus, not only are judges well-trained for textual
statutory analysis, judges are also able to see Congress’s work across a variety of
statutes and fields.
However, this specified competence might cut the other way depending on
one’s judicial philosophy. For those who advocate for courts to undertake a
purposive or evolving analysis rather than a textualist interpretation,77 a
specialization in deep textual analysis might lead courts to “miss the right
purpose-based analysis.”78 In the labor and employment realm, for instance,
those who believe the Fair Labor Standards Act should be used to extend
overtime protections to as many workers as possible might not want the judges
71. These goals are—admittedly—somewhat arbitrary. Reasonable people could, and likely should,
propose other goals based on different policy decisions. But the comparative process must start
somewhere, and these will work as a baseline.
72. Eskridge, supra note 68. See also, ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW:
THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS (discussing the importance of rigorous textual analysis).
73. RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMATICS OF MORAL AND LEGAL THEORY 257 (1999).
74. Id.
75. Diane P. Wood, Generalist Judges in a Specialized World, 50 SMU L. REV. 1755, 1756 (1997).
But see Jurisdiction of the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, 28 U.S.C. § 1295 (2012)
(authorizing exclusive but narrow jurisdiction for the Federal Circuit).
76. Wood, supra note 75, at 1767.
77. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 136 U.PA. L.REV. 1479
(1987) (arguing that courts should conduct statutory interpretation considering not the original intent,
but rather the current need).
78. Eskridge, supra note 68, at 421.
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to perform an exacting textual analysis, and might instead prefer an analysis of
the purpose and intent of the law.
Beyond the mode of interpretation, not all would-be litigants can avail
themselves of the courts’ judgement. The judiciary poses unique barriers to
access. The same factors that make the judiciary independent also increase the
cost of admission.79 Judicial “decisions are anchored in the facts of concrete
disputes between real people.”80 Unlike legislators, who can choose to resolve
issues as they see fit, the judiciary must wait for a case to be brought by parties.81
Even if parties bring a lawsuit, courts face justiciability and jurisdiction
concerns not imposed on the other branches.82 Standing requirements, in
particular, close the door on many who might otherwise wish to challenge a
particular statutory interpretation.83 Parties must have a concrete injury that is
fairly traceable to the challenged conduct and redressable by the courts.84
Likewise, parties must comply with complex, often counterintuitive procedural
rules. The complaining party must put these complaints in writing,85 file the
complaint,86 and properly serve it to the opposing party.87 Once the complaint is
filed, parties face a myriad of legal processes and rules.88 Often, hiring a lawyer is
the least expensive way to comply with the requirements necessary to pursue a
claim in court.89 In contrast, parties who wish to solicit change from the political
branches do not face such barriers to entry.
Once the case is in front of the court, the judicial problem-solving process is
unique in ways that impact courts’ abilities to interpret statutes. Courts collect
data through litigants in an adversarial setting.90 Litigants may fail to reference
the appropriate facts or may fail to give the best arguments sufficient weight.91
While courts consider policy and values, generally judges are not permitted to
make blatant policy decisions as a legislature might.92 Rather, courts must
primarily rely on the law.93 And, in making decisions, courts must attempt to

79.
80.
81.
82.

KOMESAR, supra note 59, at 125.
POSNER, supra note 73, at 257.
KOMESAR, supra note 59, at 125.
RICHARD A. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
FEDERAL SYSTEM 101 (7th ed. 2015).
83. See, e.g., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) (holding that an environmental
protection organization did not have standing to challenge a Fish and Wildlife Service regulation).
84. Id.; see also Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984).
85. FED. R. CIV. P. 8.
86. FED. R. CIV. P. 3.
87. FED. R. CIV. P. 4; KOMESAR, supra note 59, at 125.
88. KOMESAR, supra note 59, at 125.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 141.
91. VERMEULE, supra note 22, at 109.
92. Young, supra note 57, at 1837.
93. Id.
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create a principled rule that will allow consistent rulings in the future and thus
protect judicial legitimacy.94
Finally, the federal judiciary was designed so that judges would be
independent. The judiciary is significantly smaller than the executive branch,
both in physical resources and personnel.95 Federal judges are appointed for life
with a salary that “cannot be diminished.”96 Moreover, “federal judges
traditionally come to the bench as a final vocation.”97 Judges are not easily
influenced by “replacement or inducement.”98 Unlike actors in the political
branches, judges can only be replaced through death, retirement, or a difficult
impeachment process.99 And, unlike legislators, federal judges do not need to
raise money for reelection.100 Accordingly, federal judges have a unique level of
independence. Because of their independence, federal judges are—in theory—
less prone to influence from special interest groups than the political branches.
Despite these structural protections, there is great debate about whether the
judiciary is independent in practice.101 This criticism is particularly prevalent in
the issue of judge and justice selection.102 While important, these concerns are
beyond the scope of this Note. What is critical here is that the guarantees of
lifetime employment and a set salary allow for some level of judicial
independence in that judges are unconcerned with reelection.
This level of independence may have consequences in statutory
interpretation. Political officials “must understand the wants and needs of the
general public.”103 Judges, in contrast, “stand aloof.”104 This aloofness may impact
the judges’ understanding of legislation.105 Judges “are often remote from
people.”106 Their long careers may indicate their understanding of societal values

94. Id.; see also, Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV.
L.REV. 1, 15 (1959).
95. The executive branch employs 2.6 million civilians, while the judiciary employees approximately
30,000. JULIE JENNINGS & JARED C. NAGEL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43590, FEDERAL
WORKFORCE STATISTICS SOURCES: OPM AND OMB 6 (2018). See also KOMESAR, supra note 59, at 123.
96. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
97. KOMESAR, supra note 59, at 124.
98. Id.
99. See id.
100. Id.
101. See, e.g., Garrett Epps, A Failure of Judicial Independence, THE ATLANTIC, June 26, 2018,
https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2018/06/a-failure-of-judicial-independence/563789/
[https://perma.cc/MD44-AKWU] (discussing the Supreme Court’s upholding of the “travel ban”) ; Adam
Liptak, Chief Justice Defends Judicial Independence After Trump Attacks ‘Obama Judge’, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 21, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/21/us/politics/trump-chief-justice-roberts-rebuke.html
[https://perma.cc/BJX9-DYX9] (discussing the dueling statements between President Trump and Chief
Justice Roberts about the independence of the judiciary).
102. Liptak, supra note 101.
103. KOMESAR, supra note 59, at 141.
104. Id.
105. VERMEULE, supra note 22, at 64.
106. Id. at 47.
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stems from a “bygone era.”107 Judges may misunderstand the majority view.108 Or,
federal judges may act in a way that is counter-majoritarian, because they do not
feel the pressures of public accountability.109
B. The Legislature
In contrast to the judiciary, Congress is intimately tied to the citizens. It is
easier for citizens to access the legislature, and for Congress to gather information
about the will of the citizens. Congressional action, however, is not without
procedural roadblocks. And, because of its connection to the people, Congress
might be more willing to favor special-interest groups.
Congress is often characterized as more in-tune with the population than with
the judiciary.110 Congressional members are elected and, unlike federal judges
and most other civil servants, serve fixed terms.111 Therefore, legislators “must
understand the wants and needs of the general public” to remain popular enough
to be reelected.112 This connection to the public provides legislators with the
necessary information to make public policy decisions, including deciding how to
weigh different policy opinions.113 Congress, then, is defined by the
responsiveness of its members to the public.114 Because congresspersons are
elected by state or local populations, Congress represents the diverse needs of
the country.115
And it is easier for citizens to participate in the legislative process than to
participate in the judicial process. The political process is, in one sense, open to
anyone who is willing to voice their problems.116 Legislators’ decision making is
not constrained to individual cases.117 Nor does Congress have to wait for private
parties with standing to bring a claim related to the problem.118 In some cases,

107. Id.
108. Id.
109. James M. Fisher, Institutional Competency: Some Reflections on Judicial Activism in the Realm
of Forum Allocation Between State and Federal Courts, 34 U. MIAMI L.REV. 175, 194 (1980). Note that
not all critics agree that judicial action is necessarily counter-majoritarian. See, e.g., Hans Linde, Judges,
Critics, and the Realist Tradition, 82 YALE L.J. 227, 248 (1972) (arguing that the “agonizing” over the
counter-majoritarian problem in federal courts is the result of an unduly narrow view of the constitutional
system; the sorts of decisions complained about as undemocratic in federal courts are routinely made in
state courts without similar concern).
110. But this is, again, contested. See, e.g., Ron Elving, Both Parties Claim Public Support in Shutdown
PUBLIC
RADIO,
Jan.
22,
2018,
Struggle.
Who’s
Out
of
Touch?
NATIONAL
https://www.npr.org/2018/01/22/579397310/shutdown-question-who-s-out-of-touch-with-the-americanpeople [https://perma.cc/7GS4-GHMK].
111. U.S. CONST. art. I.
112. KOMESAR, supra note 59, at 141.
113. Id.
114. James O. Freedman, Review: Delegation of Power and Institutional Competence, 43 U. CHI. L.
REV. 307, 325 (1976).
115. Id.
116. KOMESAR, supra note 59, at 127.
117. Id. at 125.
118. Id.
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Congress will act without any voter involvement at all, on the mere belief that
voters are interested.119 Likewise, Congress can take the initiative—through
pollsters, for example—to gather information, rather than waiting for the
information to come to them.120
While access to Congress is relatively easy,121 Congress has its own procedural
roadblocks to action. Legislative acts are subject to bicameralism and
presentment.122 Congress likewise must comply with procedural requirements
and prioritize items on a limited agenda.123 Not to mention the abundant, current
political gridlock that forecloses most major legislative action.124
Moreover, while Congress has an incentive to appreciate the needs of the
public, legislators may not need to understand the needs of the entire general
public.125 Rather, legislators may only need to listen to the most powerful voices
of the public.126 Congress may favor special-interest groups,127 or may be more
prone to bias than the judiciary.128 And the interests that Congress is most likely
to serve are not necessarily those that protect the majority of the citizenry.129
“Widely-distributed benefits,” such as Section 1983 protections or broad worker
protections, are less likely to inspire special-interest groups.130 Each potential
beneficiary—according to political markets theorists—is less likely to invest time
advocating for the change because she has only a small stake in the overall
benefit.131 Thus, these “distributed benefit” laws are less likely to be enacted
because they do not enjoy the support of public-interest groups.132
Finally, in part because of the need for reelection and in part because of the
difficulty of creating new legislation, Congress may be tempted to delegate

119. Id. at 127.
120. Id.
121. This institutional analysis is comparative. Thus, access to Congress is relatively easy, in the sense
that citizens can make their voice heard through voting, or contacting their representatives, much more
easily than they can litigate a case. This is not meant to say that underrepresented or marginalized groups
do not face systemic hurdles to participating in the political process at all. See, e.g., Daniel Weeks, Why
Are the Poor and Minorities Less Likely to Vote?, THE ATLANTIC, JAN 10, 2014,
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2014/01/why-are-the-poor-and-minorities-less-likely-tovote/282896/ [https://perma.cc/4RXN-UXW8] (“Taken together, the surveys suggest that white citizens
who abstain from voting do so primarily by choice, while the majority of minority non-voters face
problems along the way.”).
122. I.N.S. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 952 (1983).
123. Eskridge, supra note 77, at 1531.
124. Sheryl Gay Stolberg & Nicholas Fandos, As Gridlock Deepens in Congress, Only Gloom Is
Bipartisan, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 27, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/27/us/politics/congressdysfunction-conspiracies-trump.html [https://perma.cc/HUW3-2FCQ].
125. See, KOMESAR, supra note 59, at 141.
126. Id.
127. Eskridge, supra note 77, at 1530.
128. See KOMESAR, supra note 59, at 141.
129. Eskridge, supra note 77, at 1518.
130. .See id.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 1530.
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difficult or unpopular decisions.133 Congress is now largely decentralized,
operating through “subgovernments” such as committees and agencies.134 In fact,
Congress now delegates the overwhelming majority of law making to agencies.135
C. Agencies
Agencies are the nimblest of the three institutions. Agencies are made up of
specialists. They may not be as versed in formal statutory interpretation as the
judiciary, but agencies can communicate directly with Congress. Federal agencies
also lack the formal constitutional constraints of the legislature and judiciary and
can therefore act quickly.
Unlike the judiciary and legislative branches, whose broad jurisdictional
mandates require generalists, each agency is made up of specialists focused on
one set of problems.136 Thus, agencies likely have more technical knowledge in
the underlying regulated conduct.137 This technical knowledge, and the fact that
agencies think about these problems more than courts because they deal with
them every day, might lead to better decision making—particularly in a purposive
context, where the agency must determine specific applications of laws.138
Not only are agencies more specialized, but they often communicate directly
with legislators.139 For instance, legislators will communicate when the agencies’
interpretations are off base.140 Recognition of this communication has impacted
scholars’ understanding of agency accountability:141 while most scholars once
wrote off agencies as unaccountable because they lacked an “electoral
connection,”142 a growing assembly now perceives agencies as accountable to
both Congress and the President.143 However, agencies are not only influenced
by the political branches of government, they are also influenced by special
interest groups and the media.144

133. Id. at 1532.
134. Id.
135. Young, supra note 57, at 1792. Of course, Congress does not delegate only, or even primarily, to
avoid making unpopular decisions. Rather, to meet the increasing demands for a more active
government, Congress needs to avoid the unwieldly requirements of bicameralism and presentment. One
way to accomplish this is through the administrative process. Id.
136. Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note 54, at 928.
137. Id.
138. Eskridge, supra note 68, at 421.
139. Id. at 425.
140. Id.
141. Bradley Lipton, Accountability, Deference, and the Skidmore Doctrine, 119 YALE L.J. 2096
(2010).
142. Id. at 2102.
143. Id. at 2105; Mark Seidenfeld, The Psychology of Accountability and Political Review of Agency
Rules, 51 DUKE L.J. 1059, 1059 (2001) (describing the new ways in which Congress has held agencies
accountable including, through Congressional committee, through Office of Management and Budget
review, and through Congressional fast-track review).
144. Lipton, supra note 141, at 2105.

193 - BOOK PROOF - SOWERS (DO NOT DELETE)

No. 3 2019]

8/14/2019 10:10 AM

LAW-DISRUPTIVE TECHNOLOGY

209

Another comparative institutional strength of agencies is their capacity to
plan both big picture and finite rules, and to do so relatively quickly. Unlike
courts, agencies are not required to tackle problems on a case-by-case basis.145
Rather, agencies can consider the legislative scheme and purpose.146 While
agencies can develop big picture rules, they also have the bandwidth and
expertise to provide detailed rules.147 Agencies cannot, however, perform an
entirely holistic review. Where problems cross multiple regulatory agencies (i.e.,
a new technology impacts both environmental and consumer protections),
agencies are limited to their subject areas. Thus, the specialization of agencies
could lead to conflicting analyses and interpretations.
Finally, agencies can act more quickly to develop final, nation-wide rules than
legislatures or courts. An agency does not have to wait for a case with standing
to be appealed to the Supreme Court to make a final decision. Nor does an
agency have to deal with the rigors of bicameralism and presentment. Rather,
agencies must comply with the notice and comment requirements of the
Administrative Procedure Act.148 Once the rule is promulgated, agencies
disseminate the rules quickly, through published guidance and websites.149
IV.
PUTTING IT ALL TOGETHER: INSTITUTIONAL CHOICE AND LAW-DISRUPTIVE
TECHNOLOGY
These general principles of institutional competence can be applied to the
problems of law-disruptive technology to determine which branch is best suited
to provide statutory interpretation. This comparison must be done considering
the goals established above: the ideal institutions for considering law-disruptive
technology should be democratically accountable and should quickly provide
predictable rules. Here, gig economy worker classification is useful to illustrate
the strengths and weaknesses of each branch in meeting these goals.
A. Institutional Choice Applied: Democratic Accountability
Congress and the administrative agencies are much more in tune with the will
of the people than the courts. Legislators must stay informed of the wants of their
constituents in order to be re-elected.150 Likewise, legislators have the tools to
collect the data necessary to consider the problem—and constituents’ opinions—

145. Eskridge, supra note 68, at 419.
146. Id. Agencies may be particularly familiar with individual statutes, including their enactment and
legislative history. VERMEULE, supra note 22, at 115. Agencies thus do not have to confront a particular
legislative history in each new case; they see the same sources over and over again. Id.
147. Eskridge, supra note 68, at 419.
148. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2012) (requiring at least thirty days’ notice).
149. Eskridge, supra note 68, at 419.
150. KOMESAR, supra note 59, at 141.
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holistically.151 Courts, in contrast, “stand aloof.”152 Judges are appointed not
elected.153 Judges serve lifetime appointments.154 And they have set salaries.155
Therefore, judges have much less of an incentive to pay attention to the will of
the electorate than congresspersons.
Agencies form somewhat of a middle ground. While agencies are not directly
accountable to the people, agencies are increasingly held accountable by
Congress and the President.156 And unpopular agency decisions are often
discussed in the press with blame shifting back, ultimately, to the President.157
Thus, while those running agencies are not elected, they face pressure from the
executive branch to know what the electorate wants. Because agencies are made
up of specialists,158 they may have an easier time determining the electoral will,
as they can focus on one area of policy, rather than weighing the relative strengths
of competing interests.159
The importance of democratic accountability plays out clearly in the gig
economy worker classification context. For instance, there could be a societal
consensus that gig economy workers should retain (at least some) protections
generally only given to employees. But judges have far less incentive to know
about such a societal consensus than congresspersons or agency bureaucrats.
Alternatively, there could be a consensus among gig economy workers that
they prefer to maintain the level of flexibility that being a contractor provides in
exchange for a reduction in benefits. In the political process, these workers could
band together to lobby for the ability to continue as independent contractors.
The judiciary, however, does not allow for such lobbying. Rather, the judiciary
can only consider the facts of the case before it, not the preferences of the
affected population at large.
This connection to the electorate is critical in the realm of law-disruptive
technology. Law-disruptive technology involves new, never-before-considered
problems of statutory interpretation. It makes sense for one of the politically
accountable branches to consider how the technology fits into current statutes.
Therefore, in terms of democratic accountability, Congress is the institution best
situated to handle statutory interpretation in the face of law-disruptive
technology. Agencies emerge as a second-best alternative.
151. Id. at 127.
152. Id. at 141.
153. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
154. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
155. Id.
156. Lipton, supra note 141, at 2105.
157. See, e.g., Devon Hall, New EPA Rule Would Force People to Choose Between Privacy and Health,
CNN, July 31, 2018, https://www.cnn.com/2018/07/31/opinions/epa-regulation-threatens-privacy-healthhall/index.html [https://perma.cc/ZXS9-UP8M] (criticizing a rule requiring the EPA to only consider
reports that provide their information to the public).
158. Eskridge, supra note 53, at 928.
159. As opposed to the executive, who not only has to determine the prevailing sentiment on how
labor laws should apply to the gig economy, but also has to determine whether people care about it more
or less than other completely unrelated problems, such as the need to increase infrastructure.
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B. Institutional Choice Applied: Predictability and Efficacy
The courts are also the least predictable and effective branch for dealing with
law-disruptive technology. Rather than tackling the problem as a whole, courts
must consider the decision in the framework of a dispute between two parties.160
Courts must rely on the parties to frame the factual and legal issues in such a way
that the problem can be appropriately solved.161 Thus, solutions to broad legal
problems are doled out in case-sized bites. These cases are not necessarily
integrated and can cause unpredictable or nonsensical results when viewed in
aggregate.
Gig economy worker classification, for instance, is not a single statutory
problem to be solved. Rather, there are different definitions of employee and
independent contractor depending on which federal law is being applied.162 For
example, questions of minimum wage and salary protections under the Fair
Labor Standards Act use the economic realities test.163 But determining whether
a worker is an employee for union organizing purposes uses the Internal Revenue
Service common law test.164 Thus, a court would have to wait for each type of
claim to come before it, and decide based on the facts of the case and the
appropriate test whether the worker was an employee. This may result in
multiple, potentially conflicting, classifications that apply to gig economy
workers.
Moreover, cases are not always clean. Judges may have to wade through bad
or difficult facts.165 Because the problems would be taken up by different courts
in different states considering different questions, courts would likely come up
with conflicting and unclear rules. Thus, it is difficult for courts to create a
cohesive scheme. While this is a feature of a federalist system of government, it
would have a particularly detrimental impact on law-disruptive technology.
People, companies, and the government need predictable rules for technology
that has such massive impacts. And courts are not able to provide them. To have
a truly cohesive judicial scheme, the case must make it through the full appellate
process to the Supreme Court. Nor can courts provide answers quickly. They
must wait for the complaint to come to them.166
Congress, in contrast, is situated to set the most comprehensive rules.
Congress does not have to focus narrowly on the case brought before it.167 Rather,
it is free to wield its legislative powers without prompting.168 Moreover, given the
160. POSNER, supra note 32, at 257.
161. VERMEULE, supra note 22, at 109.
162. Muhl, supra note 7.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. For example, in Lawson v. Grubhub, Inc., the plaintiff was accused of gaming the system and
agreeing to pick up orders then cancelling to receive extra paid time without making a delivery. 302 F.
Supp. 3d 1071, 1079–81 (N.D. Cal. 2018).
166. KOMESAR, supra note 59, at 125.
167. Id.
168. Id.

193 - BOOK PROOF - SOWERS (DO NOT DELETE)

212

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

8/14/2019 10:10 AM

[Vol. 82:193

development of the commerce clause, Congress can reach a vast array of
activities.169 Most importantly, unlike the other branches, Congress can change
existing legislation or create new legislation. Thus—if the law-disruptive
technology does not fit into the existing legal structures—Congress can enact new
legislation to better address the issues that the new or improved technology
presents. In this sense Congress is uniquely situated to handle law-disruptive
technology. However, while Congress can legislative holistically, it is not well
situated to move quickly—particularly not in the political climate of 2019 and the
foreseeable future. Bicameralism takes time. Each house must review, debate,
and amend the bills. Political pressures can cause delays, particularly in politically
sensitive legislation.
Congress could, in theory, be the branch best suited to solve a problem like
gig economy worker classification. It could simply legislate those rights that gig
economy workers are entitled to. Moreover, Congress could act all at once
without waiting for a case framing the precise problem, or for all the necessary
agencies to solve their specified issue. This would provide the predictability
necessary. But gig economy worker classification is a hot-button issue. There is a
lot of money at stake for the companies and unions, and workers have strong
opinions on how they should be classified. It is unlikely with the present gridlock
that Congress could realistically act quickly to put together a comprehensive
worker classification arrangement.
Agencies—again—form a middle ground. While agencies cannot create
entirely new, comprehensive legislation, they can promulgate new regulations.
Agencies have the tools and expertise to create broad and consistent rules within
their assigned areas of delegation.170 Agencies, however, present only a partial
solution in the context of law-disruptive technology because they are so
specialized: multiple agencies may be responsible for a different piece of a single
issue. Finally, agencies are the most adept of the three institutions at moving
quickly. Agencies do not have to wait for a case to be brought to them, nor do
they have to meet the requirements of bicameralism and presentment.
In the context of gig economy worker classification, the advantages and
disadvantages of agency interpretation are evident. Unlike courts or Congress,
agencies could quickly indicate how gig economy workers fit into various
employment law schemes. Agencies could provide predictability for companies
as they attempt to grow, and workers as they attempt to assert their rights. Yet
agencies are not a perfect solution. As mentioned above, the definition of
employees spans the purview of several agencies: the DOL, the IRS, and OFCCP
to name a few. The rules would not necessarily be consistent across the alphabet
soup of relevant agencies. The National Labor Relations Board would be tasked
with determining how gig economy workers fit into the National Labor Relations

169. See, e.g., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
170. Eskridge, supra note 68, at 419.
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Act.171 The Department of Labor would determine the relevant overtime rules.172
The Internal Revenue Service would have to determine how the workers would
be taxed.173
Therefore, Congress appears—based on an institutional competence
analysis—best-suited for providing predictability. But Congress also seems
unlikely to act quickly, because of bipartisanism or another such impediment, so
agencies provide a second-best solution. While agencies still must consider lawdisruptive technology problems piecemeal (based on their assigned areas of
specialty), they can consider the problems more broadly and quickly than courts.
If the goals of statutory interpretation of laws relating to law-disruptive
technology are to have a democratically accountable institution consider the
problems quickly and provide predictability, the political branches are best suited
to provide statutory interpretation.
V.
CONCLUSION
Based on an analysis of comparative institutional competency, Congress is
best-suited to interpret statutes in light of law-disruptive technology. Agencies
provide a second-best option.
But this proposed conclusion leaves at least one major practical problem.
Federal courts must consider the case in front of them.174 They cannot simply
refuse to hear a case. Of course, Congress could choose to act quickly, before
suits about law-disruptive technology become common. But, given the current
political atmosphere and Congressional gridlock, this seems unlikely.
One solution is for the U.S. Supreme Court to deny certiorari on questions
involving law-disruptive technology. In one sense, this goes against the goals of
statutory interpretation for law-disruptive technology. It slows down the process
and likely leaves inconsistent rules at the Circuit Court level. However, Congress
might be more likely to act in the face of uncertainty and unsettled law.175
The better course of action might be to have lower courts give increased
deference to agencies in cases involving law-disruptive technology.176 Some of the
benefits will be realized, namely quick decisions, consistent rules (at least within
agencies), and some democratic accountability. And, because Congress often
171. See Employee Rights, NAT’L LABOR RELATIONS BD., https://www.nlrb.gov/rights-weprotect/rights/employee-rights [https://perma.cc/4J3A-4FY6] (last visited Dec. 3, 2018).
OF
LABOR,
172. See,
e.g.,
Final
Rule:
Overtime,
DEPARTMENT
https://www.dol.gov/whd/overtime/final2016/ [https://perma.cc/67EY-Q8ZN] (last visited Dec. 3, 2018).
173. See Independent Contractor (Self-Employed) or Employee? INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE,
https://www.irs.gov/businesses/small-businesses-self-employed/independent-contractor-self-employedor-employee [https://perma.cc/N4WV-4NDF] (last visited Dec. 3, 2018).
174. Young, supra note 57, at 1792.
175. Conversely, it may be that Congress is more likely to act where it sees a Supreme Court decision
it disagrees with. This is an area where additional empirical analysis would be helpful.
176. See Eskridge, supra note 68 (arguing that increased judicial deference to agencies across the
board will lead to better statutory interpretation).
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communicates with agencies, Congress will likely hear about the interpretive and
shoehorning problems and may be more incentivized to act.
Law-disruptive technology is already changing the world. As issues involving
law-disruptive technology work their way through the legal system, courts will
have a choice: wield their shoehorns and attempt to force law-disruptive
technology into existing statutory frameworks, or yield their shoehorns and defer
to the other branches’ interpretations. Based on a comparative analysis of
institutional competence, yielding will provide the better outcome.

